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Patient-originated futility insight: Ethical right or
ethical plight?
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, Tex
Mr I.N. Felicitous suffered a dense stroke after an urgent carotid endarterectomy 3 days ago. Presently he remains
ventilator-dependent, with improving parameters. I.N. was an all-pro NFL quarterback until retirement a decade ago,
when he started a chain of fitness clubs. Physical activity has been his life. He has regained consciousness sufficient to
realize his sad state of affairs. Through written messaging, he has inquired about his disability. It has been explained that
he will need prolonged rehab, and the end result is uncertain at this time. I.N. wants to end his life by discontinuing
supportive care. His family is distraught at his request but supports his decision.What is the most desirable ethical course?
A. Accept his decision and extubate
B. Refuse and continue supportive care
C. Seek a court-appointed guardian
D. Recommend a time-limited trial of management
E. Request an ethics consultation
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fI wouldn’t mind dying—it’s the business of having to stay
dead that scares the s- - - t out of me.
R. Geis
Postoperative SICUmanagement, especially for high-risk
patients, should be understood to be individual trials of inter-
vention. True, there are bucket categories patients fit into, but
variation requiring individualization of therapy is the rule.
Intensifying therapy, as a patient’s situation worsened, was
standard in the past until restraint entered with the concept of
futility.1 Ethical dilemmas arise in the SICU when a principal
participant decides enough is enough and another dis-
agrees.2,3
When serious disagreements arise, the attending sur-
geon is at a disadvantage because the surgeon is the author-
ity without decisive authority most of the time. Once when
faced with a family demanding that the plug be pulled early
on grandfather because he would no longer be able to play
his beloved golf, one of us (J.W.J.) steadfastly objected
amidst complaints to the patient advocates, medical board,
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doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2011.05.004nd thinly veiled threats of a lawsuit. The daughter was a
ew York City ICU supervisor with motives about her
ronclad decision unclear. The impasse was bypassed be-
ause the patient had bouts of ventricular tachycardia and
he family agreed to sign DNR orders. Their will prevailed
gainst my better judgment. But sometimes we must be-
ieve things happen for the best. It remains unclear in
etrospect, as it did at the time, that the patient truly
elieved “golf was to die for.”
Trials of postsurgical critical care require stopping
ules; otherwise, such management turns into an unlimited
ttempt to prevent death. Stopping rules are beneficence-
ased because they appeal to the general concept of futility:
hereby, invoking physiologic or other types of futility.1
utility standards are rigorous: requiring evidence-based
linical judgment that an intervention is not, or is no
onger, expected to achieve a suitable outcome. Blackhall4
et the prognosis of therapy failure at 97% to 100% as the
equirement for resorting to physiologic futility. Cardio-
ulmonary resuscitation is routinely discontinued when it
an no longer be expected to restore spontaneous circula-
ion and respiration.
There are other clinically applicable specifications of
utility:
● “Overall futility” reflects a reliable expectation that the
intervention will not restore the patient’s capacity to
interact with the environment and continue human
development. Antibiotics for management of opportu-
nistic infections can justifiably be withheld from pa-
tients in a persistent vegetative state.
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pectation that the patient will die before discharge and
not recover interactive capacity before death.
● “Quality of life futility” applies when treatment will be
effective, imminent demise is not in the prognosis, and
the patient has interactive capacity. However, the pa-
tient’s current or projected condition, from the pa-
tient’s perspective, will result in an intolerable inability
to engage in or derive pleasure from life.
We emphasize that futility based on quality of life is
determined by the patient and the family, not by the
physician. Its determination should be rigorous as well. It
should be made clear to I.N. that the initial disability of
stroke is its worst and with time and rehabilitation, im-
provement will come about.
The physician’s role in discontinuing life-support is
reasonably clear, but the role for patient-originated stop-
ping rules, such as concern about poor quality of life, is ill
defined. The patient may lack sufficient insight into his or
her future functional status and the quality of life that it may
allow—or a patient’s surrogate lacks such insight. And the
degree of acceptance of disability and return of life satisfac-
tion also varies and takes time.
In this case, I.N. is likely to survive but is unlikely to
experience restitutio ad integrum. Although ultimate re-
covery is impossible to accurately predict this early, there
will be some level of disability. His relatively young age and
past physical condition are favorable predictors, but the
odds of an auspicious recovery are bleak. With dense neu-
rologic injury, as everyone is aware, recovery over the
short-term is the best predictor of eventual outcome.
The difficult question is how much disability is enough
to justify application of quality of life futility? Taken as an
extreme, patient-originated discontinuance of life support
could be seen as physician-assisted suicide. Ethically and
legally, suicide is self-destruction by introduction of a lethal
agent from outside such as a poison. Refusal of medical
care, by a mentally sound adult, even if it results in death, is
within everyone’s rights and is not suicide.
Contrarily, refusal of the surgeon to allow discontinu-
ance of life support could lock the patient in, for him, an
intolerable life style. And this should be made clear during
the discussion of a clinical trial.
The surgeon is driven to preserve life by several
factors in cases where consciousness remains intact. Be-
ing alive with major disability seems superior to the
finality of death. Many other stroke patients have learned
to lead satisfactory lives. And, because the surgeon’s
procedure resulted in the complication, there is a ten-
dency to use all measures to treat the complication. No
surgeon wants another mortality to explain at the Death
and Complications conference.
I.N.’s conclusion that an enjoyable lifestyle is fore-
closed and that the picture of the hand he has been dealt is
intolerable, is understandable. Medicine has entered a new
era where autonomy, technology, and regulatory borders
are becoming blurred. Some of the ironclad principles celied on in the past for directions have become only
agon-ruts.
In the case of I.N., is our most important role to
reserve life or to relieve and prevent suffering? Usually the
uestion demands no answer: to do one is to do both. But
ore and more, as technology advances, there can be
iversion. And ultimately, it must be up to each individual
atient and his physician to decide whether a higher pre-
ium should be placed on maintaining life or relieving
uffering when a choice must be made.5
I.N. does not satisfy the criteria of having a terminal
ondition or unremitting physical pain, or does he?
ogatz6 has published a book advocating that physician-
ssisted suicide be legalized, which should be read by
nyone seriously considering the matter. His “Gold-
locks Principle,’’ holds that “death by assisted suicide is
oo soon, death after high-tech life-prolonging treat-
ent is too late, and natural death is just right.” He
urther points out that a “natural death” assumes that
od has an interest in the time we die. The prohibition
f interference with a “natural death” apparently applies
nly to a “death too soon.”
I.N. has the undeniable right to discontinue unwanted
edical care, if he is of sound mind. I.N., however, has brain
dema, is receiving sedatives, and has not had unclouded time
o consider his dilemma. To extubate immediately would rely
n the expressed preference of an impaired individual making
he most important decision of his life correctly. Option A
ould not be appropriate, because there are serious doubts of
he patient’s decision-making capacity.
Option B, refusing the patient’s request out of hand in
his emotionally charged situation would make matters worse
y taking away any feeling I.N. has of control and add to the
uffering of both patient and family. B disrespects I.N. as a
erson and lacks compassion for all concerned.
Seeking a court appointed guardian may become
ecessary, depending on developments given time. Op-
ion C is premature. The time required would result in a
elay that would result in continued intervention. The
overt nature of achieving the objective violates profes-
ional integrity.
Getting an ethics consultation when serious moral
roblems of medical practice arise is getting a second
pinion and is a valuable adjunct, especially when the
hysician is too emotionally involved. A consultation
hould not proceed before a good-faith attempt is made
ithin the patient/physician relationship. Option E is eth-
cally preferable as the first response, with ethics consulta-
ion held in reserve.
The situation is bad but not hopeless. I.N. and his family
hould be convinced that he will get better, likely a lot better,
nd a small group of patients like him will have complete or
early complete recovery. And if anyone would fall into the
roup with extra accessory neural connections for recruit-
ent, it would be I.N. Agree with I.N. and his family to set a
ime to reevaluate and be prepared to accept and implement
he agreement. The duration should be based on reliable
linical judgment on the time for a physical declaration of
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limits are ethically impermissible. Should I.N. refuse a clinical
trial, his decision should be implemented.
There can be no doubt that medicine has long battled
death and can often artificially delay its specter, but religion
is the only claimant to trounce the final shepherd and they
cannot prove their claim.
It is a compassionate God or a compassionate nature, as
one chooses, which provides an escape mechanism from
our corruptible bodies when they become uninhabitable.
Physicians should strive to understand when an escape
mechanism is preferable.EFERENCES
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